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Summary findings
Financial  sector development is a critical area of effective  Barr and Packard  present the results of a field
social protection policy.  A well-regulated  financial sector  experiment designed  to produce an empirical  measure  of
can  complement  government efforts to keep households  the risk aversion and time preferences of selected groups
from falling into poverty-by  supplying the instruments  in Chile, which  in 1981 pioneered social  security reform
needed to pool risks or to self-insure against losses  with a transition to individual  retirement accounts. The
because  of the death or disability  of a household  experiment was designed  primarily to establish whether
member,  unexpected  loss of employment,  or inability  to  the time and risk preferences  of the self-employed differ
work in old age. But many of the policy recommenda-  significantly  from those of wage  and salaried workers.
tions that can  be drawn from the social  risk management  Barr and Packard  find no significant differences  in
framework  rest on the strong  assumption that risk and  mean  risk and time preferences between  the self-
time preferences  are uniform  across individuals  or  employed and employees  or between contributing and
households.  noncontributing employees.  But they find significant
Policies  meant to encourage  participation  in public  differences  in these  preferences between the contributing
pension  systems and to  reduce evasion  where such  and noncontributing  self-employed.  Among the self-
systems are  mandatory  (by more  closely aligning benefits  employed, those who are  more patient choose to
wvith payroll contributions  or introducing  individual  contribute to the pension system.  However, the
retirement accounts)  implicitly attempt to emulate the  contributing  self-employed  are significantly  more
savings behavior  of individuals and households  faced  tolerant of risk than the noncontributing  self-employed,
with fully functioning capital  markets  and perfect  a finding that conflicts with the assumption that the
information.  If no allowance  is made for variation  in  formal pension system  is the only source of insurance
preferences,  however,  the welfare effects of policy  against poverty in old age.
reforms  will vary across the target population.  Mandated  The Chilean pension system may be viewed  with some
social  security,  even  if actuarially  fair for most, is likely  trepidation  by its pool of potential  clients. Since risk
to  impose welfare  losses on those  less inclined to save  aversion  declines with education,  the participation  of the
and insure.  That said, a clearer picture of individual  and  economically  active who are free to choose could be
lhousehold preferences,  and how they vary across the  enhanced by a campaign  carefully designed to raise
population,  can  help governments  design social security  awareness,  allay fears,  and inform people of the benefits
systems that complement private  savings and insurance  of saving for retirement in the formal pension  system.
instruinents.
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experiment.I. Introduction
Against the  backdrop  of social  risk management,l  the a recent  flagship study of the
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  Regional  Office  concluded  that  financial  sector
development  is a critical  area of effective  social protection policy.2 A well  regulated
financial  sector  and  capital  market  can  complement  government  efforts  to  keep
households  from  falling  into  poverty,  by  supplying  the  instruments  they needed  to
either  pool  risks  or  self  insure  against  losses  due  to  the  death  or  disability  of a
household  member,  unexpected  loss  of employment,  or the inability to work  in  old
age.  However,  many of the  policy  recommendations  that  can  be  drawn  from  the
social  risk management  framework,  rest on the  strong assumption  that risk and time
preferences are uniform across individuals or households.
Policies meant to encourage participation  in public pension systems and lower evasion
where  such systems are mandatory (for example,  reforms that lead to closer alignment
of benefits  with  pay-roll  contributions,  or  the  introduction  of individual  retirement
accounts)  implicitly  attempt  to  emulate  the  savings  behavior  of individuals  and
households  faced with  fully functioning capital markets  and  perfect  information.  If,
however,  no  allowance  is  made  for  variation  in  preferences  the  welfare  effects  of
policy reforms will vary across the target population.  Mandated social  security,  even
if actuarially  fair for most, is likely to  impose welfare  losses on those less  inclined to
save and insure (Holzmann, Packard and Cuesta, 2000).  This said,  a clearer picture of
individual  and  household  preferences,  and  how they vary  across the population,  can
help govemments design social security  systems that complement private savings and
insurance  instruments.
This paper presents the results of a field experiment  designed to produce an empirical
measure  of the risk  aversion  and  time preferences  of selected  groups  of interest  in
Chile,  which  in  1981  pioneered  social  security  reform  with a transition to  privately
invested individual retirement  accounts. The experiment was conducted as a follow up
to  the  PRIESO  survey  on  risk  management,  social  security  and  savings,  and  was
designed  to  establish  primarily  whether  the  time  and  risk  preferences  of the  self
employed  differed significantly from those of waged and salaried workers.
The paper has four sections.  Following this introduction, Section II sets the context of
the  field  experiment  and  briefly  describes  the  reform  of social  security  in  Chile,
presenting  the  salient  features  of the  new  pension  system.  Section  III  outlines  our
methodological  framework.  Section  IV presents our results and Section V summarizes
our findings and concludes.
IHolzmann,  Robert, and Steen Jorgensen, 2000  "Social Protection  Sector Strategy: From Safety Net to Spring
Board'  The World Bank,
2  De Ferranti, David, Guillenmo  Perry,  Indermit Gill,  Luis Serven, with F. Ferreira, N. Ilahi,  W. Maloney and M.
Rama,  2000, "Securing our Future  in a Global Economy'  World Bank Latin America and Caribbean  Studies
2II. Revealed  Preference and Self Insurance in Chilean Pension  System
Imagine that a government  is planning to bring about a change  in  the characteristics of
a  good  with  the  aim  of raising  aggregate  utility  and  that  it wishes  to  monitor  the
effects  of this  intervention.  Imagine  also  that there  are  two types  of consumer,  one
rationed to consume the good at a certain  level, the other unrationed. The economist in
charge  of monitoring  would  most  likely  focus  her  attention  on  the  second  type  of
consumer as  it is they who are free to reveal  their preferences through changes in their
consumption patterns.  Ceteris  paribus, such a study would yield findings that could be
generalized  to the  full population  of consumers.  But what if the  consumers  sort  into
type  with  reference  to  preference  parameters  that  are  also  salient  to  their decisions
about  the  good?  Then,  it  would  be  inappropriate  to  generalize  and  the  economist
would have  to find  some  other way to quantify the effects  of the  intervention  on the
rationed consumers.
This  is  the  conundrum  facing  the  many  governments  considering  or  undertaking
reforms  of their  public  social  security  systems.  Many  require  waged  and  salaried
employees to  contribute  a  certain percentage  of their income  to  a pension  system  by
law,  while  the  self-employed  are  either  not  covered  by  or  can  easily  evade  the
mandate.  This  renders  the  self-employed  of considerable  interest  to policy  makers.
Unlike  employees,  they  are  free  to  reveal  their preferences  through  their  decisions
about  whether  to  participate  in  the  pension  system  or  not.  However,  drawing
inferences  about the welfare-enhancing  effects  of reforms on the  economically  active
population  as  a  whole  from  an  analysis  focused  exclusively  on  the  self-employed
could  be  misleading  - the  preferences  relating  to  time  and  risk  that  are  of direct
relevance  to  choices  about  pensions  may  also  play  a  role  in  the  sorting  of the
economically  active  into employees  on  the  one  hand  and  the  self-employed  on the
other.
Much of the theoretical  and empirical literature  suggests that when self employment  is
a matter of choice,  agents  with  a lower aversion  to risk  are  likely to self-select  into
that  group  (Knight,  1921,  Kihlstrom  and  Laffont,  1979).  Empirical  evidence  from
both  developed  (Taylor,  1996,  Uusitalo,  1999,  Guiso  and  Paiella,  2000)  and  middle
income  developing  countries  (Yamada,  1996,  Maloney,  1999)  supports  this  view,
although  none of these  studies  make use of direct measures  of risk aversion.  On the
other hand,  an extensive  literature,  primarily  focused on poorer developing  countries,
characterizes  self employment  not as  a  choice,  but as part of a residual  sector where
workers  who  have  either  lost their jobs  or recently  migrated  from  rural  areas,  bide
their time and queue for waged employment in modem firms (Lewis,  1954, Harris and
Todaro,  1970).  Within  this  literature  it is  implicitly assumed  that the self-employed
are  no  less  risk  averse  than  employees.  While  the  role  of time  preferences  on  the
decision to save for retirement is well established (Samwick,  1997), to our knowledge,
the link between peoples'  subjective  discount rates  and labor market  choices  has not
been  made.  We,  nevertheless,  include  time  preferences  in our  study  as they help  us
distinguish rationed from  unrationed consumers.
Although  relevant,  the  literature  on  sector  choice  does  not  currently  offer  our
imaginary  economist  the guidance  she needs.  Ideally,  such  guidance would  take  the
form of answers to three questions.  First, are employees and the self-employed distinct
3in terms of preferences  and,  in particular,  are  the self-employed  predominantly a self-
selected  group  displaying  relatively  low risk aversion?  Second,  are  employees  truly
rationed  in  the sense  that whether  they contribute to a pension system  is determined
not  by their  preferences  but  by or  simultaneously  with  the  type of job they  have?
Third, are the self-employed truly unrationed  in the sense that whether they contribute
to a pension system or not is determined by their preferences?  If the answers  to these
questions are 'no', 'yes', and 'yes' respectively, then a study of the self-employed  only
would  serve  our  economist's  purpose.  If,  however,  some  other  combination  of
answers emerges, then this relatively straightforward  approach would not suffice.
In this paper we provide answers to these three questions for Chile, the middle-income
developing  country  that pioneered  social  security  reform  in  1981.  Fiscal  pressures,
brought about by overly generous  benefits, mismanagement  and  shifting demographic
trends  that rapidly  increased  the  share  of elderly  in the population,  forced  Chile  to
dismantle  its  defined-benefit,  pay-as-you-go  (PAYGO)  pension  system,  similar  to
those  currently  administered  across  Europe,  the United States, and  other  developing
countries (SAFP,  1999). Chile  chose to adopt  a system  in which  old age pensions  are
financed  primarily  out  of  publicly  mandated,  but  privately  managed,  individual
retirement  accounts  (World  Bank,  1994).3  The  reform  lowered  the  rate  of pay-roll
taxation  and  reduced  the  pure-tax  element  of  mandated  salary  deductions  by
tightening  the  link  between  contributions  and  retirement  benefits  (Grubber,  1995).
However, just  as under the PAYGO  regime,  the self employed  were exempted  from
the mandate to save for retirement  in the new system.
Under  the  reformed  system,  participating  workers  contribute  13  percent  of their
income to institutional investors who specialize  in managing and  investing retirement
savings.  Only  10  percent  of workers'  contributions  accumulate  in  their  individual
retirement  accounts.  The remaining  3 percent  pays  the fund managers'  fees  and the
premiums  on group level  disability and  life insurance  policies that the  fund managers
are required  by law to purchase  for their contributors.  Workers who contribute  into an
individual retirement account for at least 20 years  are  guaranteed a minimum annuity
benefit  from  the  govemment  should  their  accumulated  savings  fall  short  of  a
determined  amount.  Thus,  contributors  are not  only  saving  for their retirement,  but
also  accumulating  rights  toward  a  publicly-provided  minimum  benefit  as  well  as
securing  coverage  against  risks  to  household  income  from  disability  and  sudden
death.4
Recall  that  we  do  not  simply  assume  that  the  mandate  requiring  employees  to
participate  in  the  pension  system  acts  like  a  ration.  Rather,  we  present  it  as  a
hypothesis to  be tested.  Enterprises  in the growing, unregulated  sectors in developing
3 Most countries that have undertaken structural  reform  of public social  security systems,  have retained
or  restructured  a  public  "first  pillar"  with  some  sort of distributive,  safety-net  function,  and added  a
private  "second  pillar"  of individual  retirement  savings  accounts,  funded  with  mandatory,  defined
contributions.  Finally,  most  have  establishing  the  rules  of a voluntary  "third  pillar"  of regulated  tax
incentives  and pension plans established between  employers  and employees.
4For a detailed  account of social  security reform  in Chile,  the structure  of the new pension system  and
the impact  of reforms,  see Holzmann  (1997), and Edwards and Edwards (2000). For a discussion of the
incentive  effects  expected  from a transition  to individual  retirement  accounts,  see  World Bank (1994)
and Holzmann et.  al. (2000).
4economies,  almost by definition,  do not contribute  to pension  systems  on behalf of
their employees  (ILO,  1997).  Thus, job type and pension system  participation may be
co-determined,  making  it  necessary  to  establish  whether  employees  sort  between
fommal  and  informal  jobs  knowing  that  this  will  determine  whether  they  will
accumulate  rights  to  a  pension  and,  thus,  with  reference  to  their  risk  and  time
preferences.  Similarly,  we do not assume that the self employed  are truly unrationed.
In the case of the self employed, we are less concerned with the operations of the labor
market  than  with  credit  market  imperfections.  These  may  dissuade  some  self
employed  from  accumulating  rights  to a  pension even  though  their  lifetime  budget
constraint  and preferences  indicate that they should.
III. Methodological  Framework
A. Hypotheses
Let t be an agent's rate of time preference  and r his rate of risk aversion.  Further,  let
the self-employed  be  identified by the  subscript s and  employees  by the subscript e.
Finally,  let  contributors  to pension  funds  be  identified  by the  subscript  c  and  non-
contributors by the subscript n. Now, our set of three questions can be translated into
the series of testable hypotheses presented below.
Question  Time preferences  Risk aversion
Nul  Alternative  Nul  Alternative
1.  Are salaried/waged  employees and  Ho: t, = t,  H: t, ￿  te  Ho: r, = r,  H: r, ￿  r,
the self employed distinct?  HI: r, < r,
2.  Are salaried/waged  employees  Ho: tee = tn  HI: t,, X t,,  Ho: r., = r  HI:  rec ￿  r
rationed?  HI: t  < ten  HI: r,e> ren
3.  Are the self employed unrationed?  Ho: t,,  = t,.  Hi: tc ￿  t,,  Ho: r.  = r, 1 HI:  r,,  ￿  r,.
HI:  t,.  < t . HI: r,.  > r,.
4.  Are salaried/waged  employees and  Ho: t,. = tc  HI: t.  ￿  t,c  Ho: r.  = rc  H 1: r,.  ￿  r.,
self employed contributors  distinct?  HI: t,c < t.  H 1: r,c > rec
Our two null hypotheses  relating to the first question state that employees on the one
hand and the self-employed  on the other are the same. One alternative  hypothesis, that
they  are  not  the  same,  is  presented  for  time  preferences  and  two  altemative
hypotheses,  that they are not the same and that the self-employed  are  less risk averse,
are presented for risk preferences.
To check that employees are rationed  and the self-employed  unrationed,  as we expect
under the partial mandate, we look at whether each  agent type sorts  into contributors
and  non-contributors  with respect to preferences.  In each of the four resulting sets of
hypotheses  the null is that contributors  and non-contributors  are the same. Then,  for
the hypotheses  relating to time preferences  two alternatives  are presented.  One states
that contributors  and  non-contributors  are different  and the other that the former are
more patient.
5For  the  hypotheses  relating  to  risk  preferences  the  two  alternatives  are  that
contributors  and  non-contributors  are  different  and  that  the  former  are  more  risk
averse.  Unrationed contributors will be more risk  averse than non-contributors  if the
formal  pension  system  is the only available  insurance  against poverty  in old age.  In
the case of Chile this is probably a simplification,  but the hypothesis provides us with
a basis for further discussion below.
Finally,  we add a fourth question  and corresponding  set of hypotheses.  If employees
are  rationed and  the self-employed  are unrationed,  we would expect the contributors
from the two groups to be distinct with respect to their salient  preferences.  Thus, our
fourth  set of null hypotheses states that employees  and self-employed contributors  are
indistinct.  Corresponding to each  null are two  alternative hypotheses,  the first stating
that  the  two  types  of contributor  are  distinct  and  the  second  that  self-employed
contributors are respectively patient and more risk averse.
B. Data  Collection and  Methodology
In  order  to  test the  hypotheses  listed  above,  we require  data  on  the time  and  risk
preferences  of employees and self-employed  contributors  and non-contributors  to the
pension  system  in  Chile.  A  carefully  designed  field  experiment  similar  to  the
laboratory-run  experiment  of  Schubert,  Brown,  Gysler  and  Brachinger  (1999)
generates our data on risk preferences.  For time preferences,  we adopted an approach
developed  by Donkers  and  van  Soest (1999)  that  involves  asking questions  about  a
series of hypothetical  situations.5
Economic  experiments  are  traditionally  conducted  in  university  laboratories  with
small  samples  of graduate  students,  as  in Poterba  (1988),  Kotlikoff,  Samuelson  and
Johnson  (1988),  and  Schubert,  et al. (1999).  In  order to  obtain  data  from a  sample
more relevant to our questions, we took the experiment  and hypothetical  questions to
a representative  sample  of economically  active respondents.6 Our sample was drawn
from  the  pool  of respondents  to the PRIESO  2000  survey  in  Greater  Metropolitan
Santiago  (urban, peri-urban,  and rural communities), and  stratified according to sector
(self  employment,  or  wage  and  salaried  employment)  status.  We  selected  115
employees and  115  self-employed from the PRIESO 2000 sample to participate  in the
experiment.  In the interval  between the PRIESO 2000 and the field experiment,  23  of
the  selected  self-employed  became employees.  Thus,  our final sample contained  138
employees and 92 self-employed.  Just under 60 percent of the employees  and just over
20 percent of the self-employed  were contributing to a pension  system at the time of
the experiment.
In the  experiment respondents  were confronted with a series of gambles  framed first
as investment and then as insurance decisions.  Illustrative examples of both frames of
the  risk  aversion  experiment  are  shown  in  Figure  1. Trained  numerators  asked  the
respondents to imagine themselves as investors choosing whether to invest in Firm A,
whose profits  were determined  by its chances of success or failure,  or Firm B, whose
5 Barsky,  Juster, Kimball  and Shapiro (1997) use a similar approach in their analysis of pension savings
and health benefits in the US.
6  detailed description of the study, and an example of the script and materials used  (in English and
Spanish),  are available from the authors upon request.
6profits  were  fixed  regardless  of how  well  it  fared.  The  numerators  explained  the
probabilities  of Firm  A's success,  the  pay-offs  from  Firm  A  in  each  state,  and  the
fixed pay-off from Firm  B.'  The respondents  were then asked to decide in which  firm
to invest. After registering their answer, the numerators would raise the amount of the
secure pay-off, and ask the respondents  to choose between the two firms again. As the
amount of the secure pay-off grew,  investing in Firm A looked less attractive to a risk
averse  respondent.  In  this  way  a  certainty  equivalent  - that  is  the point  at  which
respondents  would  no longer risk investing in Firm A - was elicited  for each gamble.
The probability  of Firm  A's failure was altered three times  while keeping  the state-
specific  pay-offs  constant,  and  in  the  fourth  investment  gamble,  the  pay-offs  were
altered.
The insurance gambles were similarly conducted.  Respondents  were asked to imagine
they were  the owners of a share in a company listed on the stock market. They could
choose  to  either  purchase  an  insurance  policy that  would  protect  the value  of their
share  from  market turbulence, or not to take up the policy and  face either a large or a
small  financial  loss.  After  registering  their  decision,  the numerators  would  slightly
increase  the  cost of insuring and  ask again whether they would  insure.  As the cost of
insurance  increased, the option to protect the share value would become less attractive
to the  respondent.  The  probabilities  and  pay-offs  associated  with the  four insurance
decisions  exactly matched  those of the four  investment  decisions. Respondents  were
informed  repeatedly,  both  prior  to  and  after  the  exercise,  that  any  one  of their
decisions  to  invest  or  insure  could  determine  their  earnings  from  the  experiment.
Which of their decisions ultimately determined their earnings was picked  at random at
the end of the interview.
After the  investment and  insurance  decisions,  the respondents  were asked a series of
cascading  hypothetical  questions  designed to measure their time preferences.  In each
hypothetical question,  respondents  were  asked how they would  prefer to receive their
winnings  from  a  national  lottery  draw.  One  of  the  four  cascading  hypothetical
questions is shown here as an example.
a)  Imagine  that  you  win  a cash  prize  in  the national  lottery  and  the  prize  is  worth
Ch$3,000,000.  You  can  take  your  winnings  at  once  if you  want,  but the  lottery
organizers  ask if you would be prepared to wait a year before taking your prize.
If they  were  offering  you  Ch$3,000,000  now  or Ch$3,000,000  in a  year's  time,
would  you agree to wait?
b)  What  if they  were  to  offer you more  than  Ch$3,000,000 if you  were  prepared  to
wait -what  is the minimum amount of money they would have to offer you in order
to get you to wait?
c)  Would you accept Ch$ _  _  in  a year's time instead of Ch$3,000,000 now?
If the  respondents  agreed  to  wait  after  part  (a)  of the  question,  the  numerators
recorded their answer, and proceeded to the next hypothetical  situation. If they did not
agree to  wait numerators  recorded  their answers  and moved  on to part (b),  and  then
7 The initial pay-off for Firms A if successful was Ch$3,000 (3 thousand Chilean pesos). This is slightly
higher than the average respondent's hourly income of Ch$2,282, or US$4.23  at the exchange rate
prevailing  in June, 2000, of Ch$538.61: US$1.
7recorded the amount that the respondents  would be willing to accept  in order to wait.
The numerators  would then probe  to  find out whether the respondents  would accept
progressively  lower amounts.  In this way, the numerators would establish the smallest
amount  the  respondents  would  agree  to  wait  for,  to  the  nearest  Ch$25,000.  The
numerators  recorded this final amount in each of the four hypothetical  situations,  and
proceeded onto the last part of the interview.
Prior to receiving  their pay-offs  from  the experiment,  the respondents  were  asked  a
series of questions  concerning  their  demographic  characteristics,  participation  in the
labor  market,  income,  and  finally  their  current  contributory  status  in  the  pension
system.
IV. Results
A. Individual Preferences and Treatment Effects
Every respondent  in the experiment  faced four hypothetical  decisions  relating to time
preferences,  and  two answers  were  elicited  for  each,  one  spontaneous  and  the other
probed.  Thus,  for  each  individual  in  our  sample  we  have  eight  measures  of time
preference each taking the form of subjective discount rates.8
Figure 2 shows the  frequency distributions of the  spontaneous and probed  subjective
discount  rates  for  each  decision.  Each  row  in  Figure  2 corresponds  to  a  different
decision.  In the first row we present the  subjective discount rates corresponding to an
initial  amount of Ch$3,000,000  and  a wait of one  year. The  second  row shows  the
subjective discount  rates corresponding to the current equivalent  of Ch$3,000,000  in
three months'  time. The third row shows the  subjective  discount rates corresponding
to the current equivalent  of Ch$3,000,000  in one year's  time. The fourth  row shows
the subjective discount rates corresponding to an  initial amount of Ch$300,000  and a
wait of a year.  The left-hand  column  shows  the  spontaneous  answers  and the  right-
hand column the results of the interviewers'  probing.
The interviewers'  probing took the form of challenging the respondents  as to whether
they would  accept  lower  amounts  of money.  Thus,  in  the  decisions  about  delays,
probing may  lead to lower interest rates.  In the decisions  about current equivalents to
amounts due  in the future,  probing may  lead to higher subjective  discount  rates.  The
graphs  in rows  1 and 4  correspond to delays  and, as expected, we see the  histograms
shift  left  when  probing  is  introduced.  The  graphs  in  rows  2  and  3 of Figure  2
correspond  to  speed-ups.  In  row  3, as  expected,  the histogram  shifts  right,  while  in
row 2 there is no detectable shift.
The  fixed  and  random  effects  regressions  presented  in  Table  1 provide  a  formal
analysis  of the  effects  of  variations  in  treatment.  The  fixed  and  random  effects
regressions  in  the  first  two  columns  of the  table  use  only  experimental  treatment
8 Strictly  speaking,  our time  preference measures  are the  internal  rate  of return  for the  household.  A
subjective  discount rate is the interest rate at which a household would choose flat consumption.  We do
not use  consumption  data.  Rather  we  elicited  the  effective  interest  rate  households  use  to  evaluate
various patterns of pay-offs  over time - the internal  rate of return.  For ease of interpretation,  we have
chosen to use the term "subjective  discount rate".
8variables  as explanatory variables. The treatment variables include a dummy that takes
the  value  I if the subjective  discount rate resulted from the numerators'  probing and
zero  otherwise  (Probed), a dummy  that takes the  value  I if the treatment  involved
choosing  a current  equivalent  to an  amount  of money  in the  future  and  a zero  if it
involved compensation for a delay (Now), a dummy that takes the value 1 if the choice
involved a time period of three months and zero if it involved a year (Shorter), and a
dummy  that  takes  the  value  I  if the  decision  involved  Ch$300,000  and  zero  if it
involved Ch$3,000,000  (Smaller). The random  effects  regression  in the third column
includes  several  respondent  characteristics  (income,  age,  years  of education,  sex,
marital  status,  and  location)  as  additional  explanatory  variables.  This  third  model
should not be interpreted as causal. Any significant results relating to the respondents'
characteristics  should be viewed as descriptive only.
In  the  decisions  about  delays  the  probing  led  to  a significant  fall  in  the subjective
discount rate of 10  percentage points, while  in the decisions about  speed-ups it led to
no  significant  increase.9 Both  the  graphs  and  the  regressions  also  show  that  the
respondents  chose  significantly  (0.1  percent  level)  lower  subjective  discount  rates
when paying for a speed-up  rather than being compensated  for a delay, marginally but
still  significantly  (5 percent  level)  higher subjective discount rates when considering
shorter periods of time, and significantly (0.1  percent  level) higher subjective discount
rates  when  considering  smaller  amounts.  Note  that  less  than  11  percent  of  the
variation  in the subjective  discount  rates  is accounted  for  by the treatment  variables
and respondent fixed effects. This suggests that there is considerable  noise in our time
preference  data.  The respondent  characteristics  improve the  fit of the random  effects
model  only marginally.  Consistent  with Olson  and  Bailey (1981),  Lawrence  (1991),
and Becker and Mulligan (1997),  higher incomes  are associated with greater patience
(10 percent level). None of the other respondent characteristics  are significant.
As  described  in  the  previous  section,  each  respondent  faced  eight  risky decisions.
Thus,  for  each  individual  we  have  eight  incentive  compatible  measures  of risk
aversion.  These  measures  each  take  the  form  of a  certainty  equivalent.  A  higher
certainty equivalent corresponds to a lower level of risk aversion.
Figure  3 shows  the  frequency  distributions  of the  certainty  equivalents  for  each
decision.  Each row in Figure 3 corresponds to a different gamble.  The risky option  in
the first row is Ch$3000 with a probability of 1/6 and Ch$1000 with a probability  5/6.
The risky option in the second row is Ch$3000 with a probability of 1/2 and Ch$1000
with  a probability  1/2.  In  the  third row  it is  Ch$3000  with a  probability of 5/6  and
Ch$ 1000 with a probability 1/6  and in the fourth row it is Ch$5000 with a probability
of 1/2 and Ch$2000 with a probability  1/2. Thus the expected value of the risky option
increases  as  we  move  down  the  page.  The  left-hand  column  corresponds  to  the
investment frame and the right-hand  column to the insurance  frame.
As  one  would  expect,  the  distributions  of certainty  equivalents  shift  right  as  the
expected value of the risky option increases. Our respondents  required higher certainty
equivalents for risks with higher expected values. In addition, the distributions shift to
9 The  sum of the coefficients  on Probed  and Probed*Now is not significantly different from zero at the
10 percent level.  Restricting the effect of probing to be the same for the two delay-related  decisions and
the same for the two speed-up-related  questions was accepted  by the data.
9the right as  we  move  from  the  investment  to the insurance  frame.  Our respondents
required  higher  certainty equivalents,  i.e.,  appear  less risk averse  when  the gambles
were framed  as insurance decisions.
These results  are confirmed  by the fixed  and  random effects  regressions  in Table 2.
All  the  regressions  contain  four  treatment  variables.  Gamble2,  Gamble3,  and
Gamble4 are dummies that each take the value  1 for the gamble  in the corresponding
row  of Table  2 and zero otherwise.  Insurance is a dummy that takes the value  1 for
the insurance  frame  and zero  otherwise.  The certainty equivalents  vary significantly
(0.1  percent  level)  from  one  gamble  to  another  and  increase  with  expected  value.
Further,  the  certainty equivalents  are  significantly  (0.1  percent  level)  greater  in  the
insurance  frame.' 0 Note that just  over  40  percent  of the  variation  in  the  certainty
equivalents  is accounted for by the treatment variables and respondent  fixed effects.  In
the  third  column  we  introduce  respondents'  characteristics  into  the  random  effects
model.  Once again,  this third regression  should not be interpreted  as a causal  model.
Any significant results relating to the respondents'  characteristics  should be viewed as
descriptive  only. The respondent  characteristics  improve  the fit of the random effects
model only marginally - only education  has a significant (5 percent level) coefficient.
B. Individual Preferences, Self-Employment, and  Pension Contributions:
Comparisons  of  Means and  Non-Parametric  Tests
The  focus  of  analysis  involves  a  comparison  across  employment  categories  and
between  contributors  and  non-contributors to the pension system.  For this we need a
single  proxy  for  each  of  the  preference  parameters  of interest.  The  fixed  effects
regressions  presented  above  could  be used  to construct  such measures.  However,  a
careful comparison of the 'within', 'between',  and 'overall'  R-squared goodness-of-fit
measures,  suggests that the fixed effects may not be well defined.  This being the case,
we choose the one measure among the other eight for each  parameter that most often
yields significant results in the analyses  that follow. The justification  for this selection
criterion  is that  several  of the  conclusions  we  present  below  depend  on the  power
rather than the significance  of the statistical tests we apply. The chosen measures  are,
for time preferences,  the  discount rate for a delay of twelve months on three million
Chilean  Pesos and,  for risk preferences, the certainty equivalent  relating to the fourth
insurance decision.
According  to the first  of these  measures,  the mean  subjective  discount  rate  for our
sample  is 43  percent. This compares  well with both the micro-finance  industry  rates
(32.9 to  39.3 percent per annum) and the ceiling on the retail-lending rate imposed by
the banking industry  regulator,  46.7 percent per annum, that prevailed  at the time of
the study."  In Table  3, we present  the  mean  subjective  discount  rates  for  four  sub-
samples  of our  respondents,  non-contributing  employees,  contributing  employees,
non-contributing  self-employed,  and  contributing  self-employed,  and  for  various
unions of these sub-samples. The table also contains the results of a series of two- and
one-tailed tests that correspond  to the  hypotheses presented  in  Section Im.  The mean
'O  The null hypothesis that moving  from the investment to the insurance  frame had the same effect in all
gambles was accepted at the 40 percent level.
" The ceiling rate is referred to as the "interes maximo convencional"  and can be found on the
regulator's  web page, www.sbif cl
10subjective  discount  rate  varies  only  marginally  and  not  significantly  between
employees  and  the  self-employed.  The  rate  varies  somewhat  but  not  significantly
between waged and salaried non-contributors and contributors, whereas  self-employed
contributors  have a considerably and significantly (2 percent  level on a two-tailed test,
I percent level  on a one-tailed test)  lower subjective discount rate than self-employed
non-contributors.  The  mean  subjective  discount  rate  for  the  contributing  self-
employed  is  also significantly below that of contributing employees  (14 percent  level
on a two-tailed test, 7 percent level on a one-tailed  test).
The  frequency distributions of subjective discount rates  for our various  sub-samples
are  presented  in  Figures  4  and  5. They  suggest  that  the  normality  assumption
underlying  the  t-test  may  not  be  valid  and  that  the  power  of the  test  may  be
compromised  as  a  result.  The  graphs  in  Figure  4  do,  however,  indicate  no  clear
distinction  in time preferences  between  the two agent types, while  those in Figure  5
clearly  reveal  the difference  between  contributors  and  non-contributors  among  the
self-employed  - the  former  appear  more  patient  than  the  latter.  In  contrast,  there
appears  to  be  no  difference  between  contributors  and  non-contributors  among
employees.  Some  additional  support  for these  observations  and  the  t-test  results  is
provided by a series of Epps-Singleton  (1986) non-parametric  tests presented  in Table
4. These indicate that there is no significant difference  between the self-employed  and
employees  with  respect  to  their  distributions  of time  preferences;  that  there  is  no
significant  difference  between  contributing  and  non-contributing  employees;  that
contributing  and non-contributing  self-employed  are significantly  different  (9 percent
significance  level);  but  that  self-employed  and  employee  contributors  are  not
significantly different.
In Table  5 we present the  mean certainty  equivalent  measures of risk preferences  for
our four  sub-samples  of respondents  and relevant  unions of those  sub-samples.  The
pattern  of risk preferences  that  emerges  is strikingly  similar to that  observed  when
considering  time preferences.  The  mean  certainty  equivalent  varies  only  marginally
and  not  significantly  between  employees  and the  self-employed.  It  also  varies  only
marginally and not significantly between contributors  and non-contributors.  The  only
group with  a significantly different  mean certainty  equivalent  is the contributing  self-
employed.  Their  mean  certainty  equivalent  is  significantly  above  that  of  both
contributing employees (3 percent  level on a two-tailed test,  I percent level on a one-
tailed test) and non-contributing  self-employed  (1 percent  level on a two-tailed test,  1
percent level on a one-tailed test).
The frequency  distributions  of our measure  of risk preferences  for the  various  sub-
samples of respondents  are presented  in Figures 6 and  7. These  give us no reason to
doubt  the  results  of the t-tests,  although,  once  again,  the  validity  of the normality
assumption  is  called  into  question.  This  notwithstanding,  the  Epps-Singleton  test
results presented  in Table 6 fully concur with the t-test results: there is no significant
difference  between  the  self-employed  and  employees  with  respect  to  their
distributions  of  risk  preferences;  there  is  no  significant  difference  between
contributing and non-contributing  employees;  contributing and non-contributing  self-
employed  are  significantly  different  (1  percent  level);  and  self-employed  and
employee contributors  are significantly different (4 percent level).
11C. Individual  Preferences, Self-Employment, and Contribution  to the Pension System:
Controllingfor  Other Factors
Before  drawing  any  conclusions  we  need to  check  that the significant  variations  in
preferences  across  sub-samples  are  not  spurious  and  that,  where  no  significant
variation is observed,  this is not due to uncontrolled variation relating to other factors.
Above,  we  identified  significant  relationships between  time preferences  and  income
on the one hand,  and risk preferences  and education on the other.  We need to control
for these  relationships  in  our  current  analysis  in  order  that  we may be  sure  of the
extent  to  which  agents  are  sorting  into  different  employment  categories  and  into
contributors  and  non-contributors  according  to  preferences.  Table  7  contains  three
probit.  regressions.  The  regression  in  the  first  column  takes  a  dummy  variable
indicating  whether  an  individual  is  self-employed  or not as  the dependent  variable.
The other two  regressions  take a dummy variable  indicating whether an individual  is
contributing  to  a  pension  scheme  or  not  as the  dependent  variable.  In  the  second
column the sample is restricted to the  self-employed, while  in the third it is restricted
to waged and salaried employees. As before, these regressions  should not be treated as
causal models but as controlled or conditional  correlations.
In the  first column we  see that after controlling  for income,  education,  age,  location,
sex,  and  marital  status,  there  remains  no  evidence  of a  variation  in  preferences
between the self-employed  and waged and salaried employees.  The p-values relating
to time  and  risk  preferences  in  this  regression  are  0.58  and  0.41  respectively.  The
regression  in the second column indicates that after controlling for income, education,
age,  location,  sex,  and  marital  status,  the  evidence  of a  significant  variation  in
preferences  between self-employed  contributors and non-contributors  remains.  The p-
values  relating  to  time  and  risk  preferences  in  this  regression  are  0.08  and  0.07
respectively.  The  regression  also  indicates  that  it  is  the  more  patient,  more  risk
tolerant  self-employed  who  contribute.  Finally,  the  regression  in  the  third  column
indicates  that,  while  other factors  such as education  and  sex vary between employee
contributors  and  non-contributors,  preferences  do  not.  The p-values  relating  to time
and risk preferences  in this regression  are 0.33 and 0.92 respectively.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Our aim in this paper has been to show how,  by directly measuring  preferences using
field experiments  and questions relating to hypothetical  situations, we might establish
which agents  are free  to reveal their preferences  and which  are not. This information
could  be of value  to  the designers  of parsimonious  but effective  welfare  monitoring
programmes  for policy  interventions.  We  demonstrated  the proposed  techniques  by
exploring three questions relating to the decision to  save and invest for retirement  in
the  Chilean  pension  system  of  privately  managed  individual  accounts.  Those
questions  were  (1)  are  employees  and  the  self-employed  distinct  in  terms  of
preferences,  (2)  are employees truly rationed  in the sense that whether they contribute
to  a  pension  system  is  not  determined  by their  preferences,  and  (3)  are  the  self
employed unrationed  in the  sense that whether they contribute  to a pension  system or
not is determined  by their preferences?
12Our findings  suggest that  the answer to first  question  is 'no'. There  is no significant
difference  in mean  risk  and time  preferences  between  the  self-employed  and waged
employees.  Potentially more  powerful  non-parametric  tests  that  take account  of the
full  distributions  of preferences  confirmn  this result,  as does  a regression  analysis  in
which  we  also  control  for  other  factors  such  as  income,  education,  age,  sex  and
marital status.
Our findings  suggest that the answer to the second question  should be  'yes'. There is
no  significant  difference  in mean risk and  time preferences  between  contributing  and
non-contributing  waged  employees  and,  once  again,  this  result  is  confirmed  by
potentially more powerful non-parametric  tests and a regression  analysis in which we
control for the other factors listed above.
Finally, our findings suggest that the answer to the third question  should also be 'yes'.
Mean  risk  and time preferences  do  vary  significantly  between the  contributing  and
non-contributing  self-employed.  Once  again,  this  result  is  confirmed  by  the  non-
parametric  tests  and  a  regression  analysis  in  which  we  control  for  other  factors.
Consistent with theory,  it is the more patient  self-employed who  choose to contribute
to  the  pension  system.  However,  in  conflict  with  the  assumption  that  the  formal
pension  system  is  the  only  source  of insurance  against  poverty  in  old  age,  self-
employed contributors  are significantly more tolerant of risk than the non-contributing
self-employed.
This last finding suggests that the  Chilean pension  system may be viewed with  some
trepidation  by its pool of potential  clients.  This may be because those who are more
risk  averse  prefer  to  rely  on  alternative,  traditional,  family-based  forms  of  social
security  or may be deterred by the financial  risks  associated  with the capital markets
in which retirement  savings are invested under the reformed system.
Alternatively,  these potential clients may be poorly informed about the system and the
performance  of the  private  fund  managers  who,  despite the  substantial  variability  in
real  annual  returns shown  in Figure  8,  have earned  a real  average annual return of 11
percent  for  participants  since  the  inception  of the system  (SAFP,  1999).  Bearing  in
mind  that risk aversion declines  with education, the participation of the economically
active who are free to choose could be enhanced  by a campaign  carefully designed  to
raise awareness,  allay fears, and inform people of the benefits of saving for retirement
in  the  formal  pension  system.  Finally,  our  findings  motivate  a closer  look  at the
informal  strategies  the  self-employed  may  be  using  to insure  against  poverty  when
they lose the ability to work with old age.
The  Chilean  study  effectively  demonstrates  the  value  of measuring  preferences
directly  and analyzing the  resulting  data in conjunction  with simple survey data.  We
have  shown  that our  findings  are  robust to different  methods  of analysis  and to the
inclusion of additional  variables as controls.  This notwithstanding,  there is a need  for
caution.  Two out of three of our conclusions  are dependent  on the power, rather than
the  significance of the statistical tests we apply.  With a larger sample size, significant
variation  between  agent  types  might  be  observed  where  currently  it  is not.  We  are
confident  that,  even  if a  larger  study  found  some  variation  in preferences  between
contributing and  non-contributing  waged  employees,  it would  conclude that the self-
employed  are  better  able  to  reveal  their  preferences  and  are,  thus,  a  much  more
13interesting  focus for a monitoring exercise.  However, the slightest hint of variation  in
preferences between waged employees  and the self-employed would cast doubt on the
appropriateness  of a study focused exclusively on the self-employed,  as it would warn
against drawing of inferences  about the welfare of the former  from  the behaviour of
the latter.
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16Table  1:  Regression  analysis  of  subjective  discount  rates  from  hypothetical
questions relating to time preferences
fixed effects  random effects  random effects
Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.C.  Coef.  s.e.
Constant  0.439  0.029 "t  0.439  0.033 *"  0.374  0.103  *
Probed  -0.098  0.033  '  -0.098  0.033  *  -0.098  0.033  *
Now  -0.298  0.041  +  -0.298  0.041  *  -0.297  0.041  *
Shorter  0.074  0.033  **  0.074  0.033  **  0.074  0.033 **
Smaller  0.271  0.033 *  0.271  0.033  +  0.275  0.033 t
Probedx Now  0.145  0.047  **  0.145  0.047***  0.146  0.047***
Income  -0.070  0.039 *
Age  0.001  0.002
Yrs  of  ed.  0.005  0.006
Female  0.015  0.044
Rural  0.057  0.050
Married  0.012  0.044
R-sq:
within  0.146  0.146  0.147
between  < 1.0e4 < 1.0e4  0.023
overall  0.107  0.107  0.114
Observations  1840  1840  1832
Individuals  230  230  229
Probed  Dummy which takes the value I if the interviewer probed.
Now  Dummy  which  takes  the  value  I  if the  question  elicited  a current  equivalent  of an
amount of money  available  in the future  and the  value 0 if the questions deals  with a
delay.
Shorter  Dummy  which takes the  value  I if the  period of time  in question  is  3 months and  the
value 0 if the time period is one year
Smaller  Dummy  which takes the value  I if the questions  relates to $300,000  and the value 0  if
the questions relates to $3,000,000
Income  Total  monthly income of individual  in millions of Chilean Pesos adjusted in accordance
with CEPAL (I  999)
Age  Age in years of individual
Yrs  of ed.  Number of years of formal education of individual
Female  Dummy which takes the value I for females
Rural  Dummy which takes the value I for respondent in a rural area
Married  Dummy which takes the value I for married respondents
Notes: ***  -significant at the  1% level; ** -significant at the 5%  level; * - significant at the 10%  level.
17Table  2:  Regression  analysis  of  certainty  equivalents  from  risk  tolerance
experiments
fixed effects  random effects  random effects
Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coe.  s.e.
Constant  1665.892  32.214 ***  1667.527  41.576  ***  1347.917  148.102  *
Gamble2  341.641  40.807  ***  340.053  40.905 *  335.859  40.916  ***
Gamble3  868.242  40.834 ***  866.905  40.930  *  865.484  40.942  *
Gamble4  1638.310  40.871  ***  1634.263  40.946 ***  1625.817  40.958 ***
Insurance  113.030  28.915***  111.894  28.972***  112.735  28.980***
Income  32.187  56.788
Age  1.810  2.436
Yrs of  ed.  19.531  8.642 **
Female  -33.409  64.704
Rural  66.132  73.868
Married  78.972  63.915
R-sq:
within  0.540  0.540  0.539
between  0.003  0.003  0.021
overall  0.416  0.416  0.426
Observations  1800  1800  1792
Individuals  229  229  228
Gamble2  Dummy which  takes the value  I for decisions  in which  the risky option  is $3000 with a
probability  of 1/2  and $1000 with a probability 1/2.
Gamble3  Dummy which takes the value  I  for decisions  in which the risky option  is $3000 with a
probability of  5/6 and $1000 with a probability  1/6
Gamble4  Dummy which takes the value  I  for decisions in which the risky option  is $5000 with a
probability of 1/2 and $2000 with a probability  1/2.
Insurance  Dummy which takes the value  I for decisions framed as insurance decisions.
Income  Total  monthly income of individual  in millions of Chilean  Pesos adjusted in accordance
with CEPAL (1999)
Age  Age in years of individual
Yrs  of  ed.  Number of years of formal education  of individual
Female  Dummy which takes the value  I for females
Rural  Dummy which takes the value I for respondent  in a rural area
Married  Dummy  which takes the value  I for married respondents
Notes: *  -significant at the 1% level; ** - significant at the 5% level; * -significant at the 10%  level.
18Table 3: Comparison  of time  preferences  between  employees  and  self-employed
who  are and are not contributing to pension funds
Non-contributing  Contributing  All
Employees  47%  39%  43%
(57)  (81)  (138)
Self-employed  47%  27%  43%
(72)  (20)  (92)
All  47%  37%  43%
(129)  (101)  (230)
Tests of differences  in means with equal variance not assumed
(two-tailed  test P-values reported first, one-tailed  test P-values in square brackets)
Hypotheses  P-value
I.  Ho: Waged/salaried  employees and the self-employed  have the  samne
time preferences  98%  [51%]
2.  Ho: Among waged/salaried  employees,  non-contributors  and
contributors have the same time preferences  29%  [14%]
3.  Ho: Among the self-employed,  non-contributors  and  contributors have
the same time preferences  2% [1 %]
4.  Ho: Among contributors waged/salaried  employees and self-employed
have the same time preferences  14%  [7%]
Notes: Znuber of observations  reported in curved brackets.
Table 4. Results of Epps-Singleton  non-parametric tests for significant difference
between  samples w.r.t. the distribution of time preference
Time Preference
Hypotheses  P-values (two-tailed  test)
1.  Ho: The time preferences  of waged/salaried  employees  and the self-
employed  are  identically distributed  11%
2.  Ho: The time preferences  of waged/salaried  employee  non-
contributors and contributors  are identically distributed  50%
3.  Ho: The time preferences  of self-employed  non-contributors  and
contributors are identically  distributed  9%
4.  Ho: The time preferences  of waged/salaried  employees and self-
employed  are identicaly  distributed  11%
19Table  5:  Comparison  of  risk tolerance  between  employees  and  self-employed
who are and are not contributing to pension funds
Non-contributing  Contributing  All
Employees  3457.14  3450.00  3452.94
(56)  (80)  (136)
Self-employed  3333.33  3860.00  3451.68
(69)  (20)  (89)
All  3388.80  3532.00  3452.44
(125)  (100)  (225)
Tests of differences  in means with equal variance not assumed
(two-tailed  test P-values reported first,  one-tailed test P-values in square brackets)
Hypotheses  P-value
1.  Ho: Waged/salaried  employees and the self-employed  are equally
risk averse  99%  [50%]
2.  Ho: Among waged/salaried  employees non-contributors and
contributors are equally risk averse  96% (48%]
3.  Ho: Among the self-employed  non-contributors  and contributors  are
equally  risk averse  1% [1%]
4.  Ho: Among contributors  waged/salaried  employees and self-
employed  are equally risk averse  3%  [1%]
Notes: Number of observations reported  in curved brackets.
Table 6: Results of Epps-Singleton non-parametric tests for significant difference
between samples w.r.t. distribution of risk preferences
Risk Aversion
Hypotheses  P-values (two tailed  test)
1.  Ho: The risk preferences  of waged/salaried  employees  and the self-
employed  are identically distributed  56%
2.  Ho: The risk preferences  of waged/salaried  employees non-
contributors and contributors  are identically  distributed  96%
3.  Ho: The risk preferences  of self-employed  non-contributors and
contributors  are identically distributed  1%
4.  Ho: The risk preferences  of waged/salaried  employees and self-
employed  identically distributed  4%
20Table 7:  Probability of Self Employment, Self Employed Contributor, Employed
Contributor
Dependent  Var.  Self Employed  Contributing Self Employed  Contributing Employee
Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.  Coef.  s.e.
Constant  -1.655  0.572***  -1.916  0.921  -1.412  0.835
Income  0.347  0.211 *  0.334  0.217  0.740  0.611
Yrsof ed  0.055  0.026**  0.052  0.044  0.142  0.039***
Age  0.025  0.008***  -0.024  0.016  0.012  0.011
Rural  0.231  0.224  -0.056  0.429  -0.086  0.313
Female  -0.434  0.195**  0.211  0.393  -0.614  0.247***
Married  0.172  0.191  0.501  0.413  0.345  0.245
Time pref  -0.113  0.206  -1.112  0.636*  -0.269  0.273
Riskpref  -8.3e45 1.Oe04  3.8e"4  2.1e-4*  -1.3e45 13eN° 4
Number of obs  225  88  136
Log likelihood  -135.861  -36.891  -76.361
Wald chi2(8)  28.810  16.780  27.920
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.032  0.001
Pseudo R2  0.100  0.218  0.171
Income  Total monthly income of individual  in millions of Chilean Pesos adjusted  in
accordance with CEPAL  (1999)
Yrs of ed  Number of years of formal education of individual
Age  Age in years of individual
Rural  Dummy which takes the value I for respondent  in a rural area
Female  Dummy which takes the value I for females
Married  Dummy which takes the value I for married respondents
Time pref  Subjective discount rate (preferred  measure)
Risk pref  Certainty equivalent (preferred measure)
Notes:
*** -significant at the 1% level; ** -significant at the 5% level;  * - significant at the  10%  level.
Standard errors  are adjusted  for heteroskedasticity  using White's (1980) estimate of covariance matrix
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